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Abstract: This paper assesses the relationship between public participation and 
accountability in ICANN. It explains how ICANN has responded to 
accountability concerns by creating new opportunities for public comment, 
review, and participation. Is public participation an adequate means of making 
this global Internet governance organization accountable to the public? ICANN 
is fundamentally a private corporation. Private corporations are held 
accountable in three ways: 1) directly through their membership or 
shareholders, 2) through competition, which gives the public the opportunity to 
avoid their products or services, and 3) through external regulation or 
supervision by judicial or public authorities. None of these forms of 
accountability apply to ICANN.  Instead, the public is given a wide range of 
opportunities to participate in ICANN’s processes and to voice their opinions. 
This paper questions whether participation is an adequate substitute for 
accountability. It analyzes three distinct reforms in ICANN’s history to show how 
participation can displace accountability rather than improve it. 
Participatory evangelism 
Participation seems to have become the main legitimizing principle of all forms 
of Internet governance.1 The answer to every criticism of a policy or a process is to issue 
a call for more people to “get involved” in the process. The answer to any legitimacy 
challenge is for the process to “be more inclusive.”  The response to all distributional 
inequities is to call for special efforts to bring the marginalized and disadvantaged 
directly into the policy making process.2 Whether it is ICANN, the UN Internet 
Governance Forum, the Regional Internet Registries, the many new national and regional 
IGFs or the OECD, maximizing public participation, sometimes in processes of dubious 
value, has become the overriding impetus of all Internet policy making structures. 
Participation and inclusion have almost become ends in themselves. 
The new participatory evangelists, however, seem more willing to offer people 
opportunities to get involved than they are willing to offer them real authority or 
influence over the decisions. There is an important distinction between “making your 
views known” and “making your views count.” When the public is offered the 
opportunity to participate in Internet governance institutions, which of these two – self-
expression or some tangible measure of decision making power – is the public being 
offered?  
That question bears directly on the future of ICANN. As it is currently 
constructed, ICANN invests a large amount of its budget on public participation. 
ICANN’s accountability mechanisms as a global governance institution for the Internet 
                                                
1 A more academic version of this paper will be published in the Korean Journal of Policy Studies Vol 24, 
No. 2, Dr. Jisuk Woo, editor. A special thanks to KJPS and Dr. Woo for organizing the conference at which 
the initial draft of this paper was given. 
2 Or at least the people who claim to speak for them, who always seem to be affluent folks from developed 
countries. 
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are still, after 10 years, a matter of interest and concern. Its perceived legitimacy, though 
improving, is also frequently questioned.3 Typically, ICANN responds to legitimacy and 
accountability concerns by creating new opportunities for public comment, public review, 
and public participation. It is time to assess the relationship between participation and 
accountability in a deeper, more systematic way. 
ICANN the corporation 
Several years ago the Harvard Berkman Center’s John Palfrey (2004) characterized the 
mission and organizational form of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) as an unusual mash-up of three distinct institutional models. ICANN, 
he wrote, simultaneously purported to be 1) a private corporation run from the top down 
by a Board of Directors; 2) an open space for the development of bottom-up consensus 
about policy, similar to Internet standards organizations; and 3) a governmental 
regulatory body, with fair representation of affected stakeholder groups in a legislative 
process for the development of public policies. According to Palfrey, 
…ICANN’s structure was a compromise in the worst sense of the word. The 
designers attempted to blend the best parts of a corporation, a standards body, and 
a government entity, but they ended up with a structure that does not carry the 
legitimacy or authority or effectiveness of any of its component parts. (2004, p. 
425) 
To anyone familiar with ICANN’s workings, the observation about mixed models rings 
true. ICANN constantly refers to its processes as “open,” “bottom-up” and “consensus-
based,” drawing on norms derived from Internet standards organizations such as the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).4 At the same time, its structure attempts to 
provide balanced representation of different “constituencies” or “stakeholder groups” as 
if it were a governmental legislative body; moreover, its processes are laden with public 
notice and comment requirements characteristic of a government agency formulating 
regulations. At the same time, ICANN is legally a private corporation (specifically, a 
California nonprofit public benefit corporation). All decision making authority rests 
solely and exclusively in the hands of a Board of Directors. The huge number and 
complex nature of the decisions the Board must make and the large number of meetings 
held means that the Board must rely on an increasingly large, professional staff to 
manage its information flows and procedures. The Board has practically untrammeled 
authority to dispose of the recommendations and policies handed to it by its various 
advisory committees and supporting organizations. It can modify the bylaws governing 
its processes and structures almost at will; and it has done so, making modifications at a 
pace of at least two a year for the past decade. Most importantly, the Board governs 
Internet identifiers by means of private contracts. While the substance of the contracts is 
influenced in some ways by general policies developed by its bottom-up, representational 
organs, the critical details and implementations are negotiated bilaterally between the 
corporation and the private businesses that operate under the terms of those contracts. 
Palfrey and others (e.g., Koppell 2005; Pommerening 2004) have implied that the 
strange combination of corporation, standards body and governmental agency in a single 
institution causes both legitimacy problems and organizational turmoil. Consistent with 
                                                
3 Generally, accountability can be viewed as an ex post factor (the organization makes a decision, and is 
then held accountable)  whereas legitimacy is an ex ante concern, based more on input; i.e., the 
organization makes decisions based on an appropriate and representative level of inputs received, and so 
the decisions are accepted as legitimate from the start.  
4 The term “bottom-up” appears five times in its own “ICANN Factsheet,” which makes claims such as 
“ICANN does not create or make Internet policy. Rather, policy is created through a bottom-up, transparent 
process involving all necessary constituencies and stakeholders in the Internet Community.” ICANN 
Factsheet, http://www.icann.org/en/factsheets/fact-sheet.html, accessed October 31, 2009. 
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these arguments, ICANN has gone through constant structural change and many 
challenges to its legitimacy since its founding in 1998. It went through some sweeping 
structural changes late in 20025 and is now going through another round of reformation.6 
Nevertheless, there is a method to the madness; an emergent order underlying the 
apparent chaos. ICANN has, in fact, learned to integrate these three organizational 
tendencies in a unique way. The key to understanding the interrelationship among them is 
to focus on the problem of accountability. Accountability – or the avoidance thereof – 
provides the key that unlocks many of the mysteries of ICANN’s structure – including its 
strong emphasis on public participation. 
The thesis of this paper is that ICANN is, first and foremost, a private 
corporation. Its status as a private corporation dominates its approach to representation, 
participation and accountability. Like any corporate entity, ICANN is concerned 
primarily with its own survival and wants to be as autonomous as possible. It resists 
being subjected to the authority of any external agency, be it a membership, a collection 
of governments or an independent judiciary. In short, we are dealing with ICANN, Inc. 
When this paper asserts that ICANN is a corporation it recognizes that it is a 
public benefit corporation and that its mission, bylaws and articles of incorporation (and 
its new Affirmation) invoke the public interest as a guiding principle. The paper also 
acknowledges that many if not most of ICANN’s Board members are sincerely devoted 
to discovering and implementing policies that serve the global public interest. No matter 
how much ICANN’s Board and staff profess to act on behalf of the public, however, the 
fact remains that it is not accountable to the global public in any significant way. It is, as 
this paper will explain, still fundamentally disconnected from most of the accountability 
mechanisms that normally accompany a corporation, a standards development 
organization or a government agency. In the absence of these moorings, the chief concern 
of a private corporation, whether for-profit or nonprofit, becomes its own survival, 
growth, security and autonomy. The corporation’s understanding of the public interest 
will, inevitably, be profoundly shaped by its own organizational imperatives.  
Once ICANN Inc.’s basic nature is understood, it is easier to understand how its 
devotion to representation and bottom-up participation, which Palfrey found inconsistent 
with its status as a private corporation, performs an important function. Participation and 
representation can give people the feeling that they have a stake in the policy making 
process, even when they are in fact relatively powerless. Participation can create 
legitimacy and some semblance of accountability, even when it is absent. The large 
amount of staff and financial resources and public relations activity ICANN invests in 
inviting public comment and participation allows ICANN to achieve greater public 
legitimacy; this in turn helps it to avoid more direct, harder forms of public 
accountability.  
Real accountability means that the actions of the Board and staff are held in check 
or reversed when they violate the rules and principles governing ICANN or clash with the 
interests of its constituents. Participation, in contrast, simply offers the Board viewpoints 
that it can accept or reject depending on its own interests and perceptions. Furthermore, 
whatever participation takes place must flow in channels and procedures defined by the 
Board and staff themselves and can be readily altered, either to win more support or 
participation from influential external constituencies, or to avert threats to the 
corporation’s autonomy and interests.  
                                                
5 STUART LYNN, PRESIDENT’S REPORT: ICANN — THE CASE FOR REFORM, INTERNET 
CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (Feb. 24, 2002), at 
http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm. 
6 Here I refer to both the “GNSO Improvements” and the replacement of the JPA with the Affirmation of 
Commitments. Both are discussed in greater detail below. 
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If participation can both legitimate the corporation’s governance role while 
simultaneously allowing it to avoid direct accountability, it is clearly in the interests of 
ICANN, Inc. to maximize public participation and the degree to which the participants are 
“representative” of the general population, while minimizing the degree to which the 
participatory and representational structures are capable of actually controlling the 
Corporation’s actions. In short, public participation can displace public accountability or 
become a substitute for it.  
That is the basic thesis of this paper. The rest of the paper is divided into two 
parts. The first part provides the conceptual underpinnings of the thesis. It analyzes the 
various modes of accountability that might be applied to ICANN, and shows in abstract 
terms how ICANN employs public participation and representation as substitutes for 
accountability mechanisms. 
The second part describes the process of substitution in empirical-historical terms. 
It analyzes three structural reforms that have taken place in ICANN since 2003. The three 
are: 
• The replacement of direct election of Board members with the At Large 
Advisory Committee and Nominating Committee 
• The current round of structural changes in the Generic Names Supporting 
Organization (GNSO) 
• The replacement of the Commerce Department Joint Project Agreement with 
an “Affirmation of Commitments.” 
The final section explores the implications of this analysis for civil society participation 
in ICANN.  
Modes of Accountability 
Table 1 below provides a schematic summary of four different types of 
accountability and how they correspond to the three organizational models upon which 
ICANN was founded. The first type of accountability is “Direct” accountability. This 
allows people to influence the organization through voting for the key decision makers in 
the organization. It affords them a special status, such as membership or citizenship, 
which brings with it voting and other rights. It is the core concept behind democratic 
accountability. The second is what I call “Exit” accountability. This refers to competition, 
or the ability of subjects or citizens to escape the authority or services of the entity if its 
policies or performance are unacceptable. This is the core of market accountability. The 
third form of accountability is labeled “External.” It consists of an oversight or appeals 
process conducted by an independent entity with the authority to reverse the 
organization’s decisions or impose sanctions on it for failure to comply with agreed rules. 
This is the core concept behind the rule of law or legal/constitutional accountability. Last, 
there is what I call “Voice,” a form of accountability which encompasses the ability to 
directly participate in a process and express one’s opinions. This involves deliberating 
over, formulating and promoting desired decisions and policies, as well as protesting or 
criticizing undesired decisions and policies.  
As an accountability mechanism, Voice is arguably the weakest of the four, unless 
it is combined with the other modes. Engaging in deliberations or expressing one’s view 
about policy has no guaranteed effect on the actual decisions taken. If participation is 
completely detached from Direct, Exit or External forms of accountability, it has no 
effect on an organization other than what its decision makers choose to give it.  
Table 1 also shows how these four types of accountability are related to the 
different organizational types. A gray cell indicates that the organizational form in the 
column typically does not or cannot rely on that mode of accountability. The discussion 
below is organized according to the three organizational types.  
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Table 1: Modes of accountability mapped to organizational models 
 Organizational models   
Accountability 
modes   Corporation Consensus-based standards Governmental 
Direct Shareholders (profit); Members (nonprofit) Election of WG chairs 
Citizenship and 
voting; 
Representation 
Exit 
Competitive 
alternatives (profit); 
Refusal to support 
(nonprofit) 
Voluntary adoption  
External 
Conformity to  
public law; 
Government 
regulation 
 Rule of law; Judicial review 
Voice  Open participation Lobbying, public hearings, protests, etc. 
Direct accountability 
In private commercial corporations, shareholders exercise direct accountability, 
and in nonprofits, members can exercise direct accountability. Both types of direct 
accountability allow people to vote for or against Board members and literally remove 
undesired decision makers from office or help place someone desired on the Board. 
Membership or shareholder status may confer other legal rights as well, such as a right to 
receive more information or to participate in certain processes. 
In the governmental model, an electorate composed of citizens is able to exercise 
direct accountability by voting in elections. There are also multiple layers of 
representational structures, put into place through such voting.  
A consensus-based standardization process, on the other hand, has weaker forms 
of direct accountability when they are truly open and there are no members. Working 
Group chairs might be elected or appointed by the participants. Some formalized 
standards organizations may have members who are empowered to vote to select officers 
or approve policies. But these should be characterized as nonprofit corporations rather 
than as open, bottom-up organizations such as the IETF. 
Exit accountability 
Competition is an important accountability mechanism. It directly and tangibly 
punishes an organization for poor performance and, assuming a better alternative can be 
found, improves the condition of the party who exits. Private commercial corporations 
are normally subject to strong forms of exit accountability. The products and services 
they produce can be produced by other organizations. Nonprofit private corporations, if 
they are not tax-supported, are also subject to significant kinds of exit accountability. 
Members and funders can abandon them and start alternative organizations or transfer 
their support to other organizations if they do not perform the way they want. 
Open standards organizations are subject to powerful forms of Exit 
accountability. In most cases, no one has to adopt the standards they produce. If they 
want to be relevant they have to produce standards that are broadly beneficial, widely 
supported and meet the needs of the relevant constituencies.  
Governments, on the other hand, are only weakly subject to exit accountability. 
They are by definition territorial monopolies on the provision of public functions, and it 
is highly costly and disruptive for citizens to abandon their citizenship to escape them.  
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External accountability 
The private corporate form is potentially subject to different layers of external 
accountability. It can be subject to externally-defined public law, as well as to more 
specific forms of governmental regulation. Most (liberal-democratic) governments are 
subject to external accountability, too. Ideally, the actions of states are subject to judicial 
review by independent judges who can reverse or modify their decisions if they 
contravene basic constitutional law.  
Consensus-based standards organizations, on the other hand, are difficult to 
subject to external accountability. While the individuals and organizations involved must 
obey basic civil and criminal laws, it would be hard for an external, judicial-type 
authority to second-guess or regulate their functioning as consensus-builders and 
technical solution developers. These organizations may develop their own internal 
appeals procedures to guard against abuse of their processes, however.  
Voice 
As noted above, “voice” or participation can be used as a mode of making 
organizations accountable. In the private corporation model, however, voice is typically 
the least important accountability mode. Private corporations are not set up to encourage 
open public participation in the making of their decisions and policies. By definition, the 
corporate form of organization sets up a boundary between the general public and a 
smaller group of owners or shareholders who make decisions by and for themselves. 
While corporations may respond to strong and concerted expressions of negative public 
opinion, it is mainly because such expressions threaten to trigger some form of exit or 
external regulation.  
A partial exception to this rule occurs when private corporations leverage peer 
production techniques or crowd-sourcing, such as software producers who leverage open 
source methods or web services providers who organize and channel customer feedback. 
Corporations that do this are integrating Voice into their decision-making apparatus 
rather extensively. However, the real motivation for this is that their customers and users 
have a strong exit option. Voice is not so much an accountability mechanism as it is a 
method of learning and adapting; it is used to gather feedback and improve upon their 
products in an environment governed by market competition. 
Governments, too, rely heavily on Voice if they are democratic in nature. 
Lobbying, public hearings, protests, petitions, and monitoring of news all constitute 
essential forms of being responsive to the public’s wishes. But with governments, Voice 
as a mode of accountability is clearly subordinate to Direct accountability, just as Voice 
is subordinate to Exit with private corporations. In a governmental context, Voice is 
primarily a means of gauging demand for policies, laws and regulations. If public 
officials assess that demand correctly they will be rewarded at the polls; if they judge it 
incorrectly or disregard it, they will be punished at the polls. If governments are not 
subject to Direct accountability, Voice tends to be disregarded, or even suppressed. 
Consensus-based standards organizations, on the other hand, derive nearly all of 
their legitimacy and accountability from the exercise of Voice. They style themselves as 
expert meritocracies, or, if they want to be pretentious, as Habermasian discourse 
communities. (Froomkin, 2003a) As such they have strong incentives to at least listen to 
all sides of a controversy before making a decision. As with private corporations, 
however, the incentive to incorporate Voice is strongly dependent on the prospect of Exit 
or competition.  
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ICANN and the modes of accountability 
With this framework in place, we are better able to analyze and interpret ICANN, 
Inc.’s unique approach to accountability and participation. Table 2 shows how ICANN as 
governance organization relates to the various accountability modes.  
Table 2: ICANN and the modes of accountability 
Accountability 
modes   
Present in 
ICANN? Comments 
Direct No 
No membership, very indirect forms of Board 
appointment (Nominating Committee, SO 
elections) 
Exit No 
Monopoly power; limited possibility of a 
competing root 
External Weak 
California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation 
law; A nonbinding independent review process 
(IRP) 
Voice Yes 
Extensive opportunities for public participation 
and comment. Very open treatment of 
information. Staff and Board very accessible. 
 
The chart reveals that ICANN’s pattern of accountability is the exact opposite of 
that normally associated with private corporations. Table 1 indicates that private 
corporations, whether market-based on nonprofit, typically rely primarily on Direct and 
Exit modes of accountability. Additionally, corporations are subjected to External 
regulation depending on the degree of monopoly power they have or the degree of public 
dependency on their operations. Private corporations are not structured to rely heavily on 
Voice or, if they do, it is merely an extension of their concern with Exit.  
ICANN inverts this pattern. It has no membership or shareholders to provide 
Direct accountability. There is no credible Exit option, aside from the costly, unlikely 
“nuclear option” of forming an alternate DNS root. Despite having what is in effect 
strong monopoly power over an essential facility, this private corporation is subject to 
rather limited forms of External accountability as well. The absence of External 
accountability in ICANN’s case is explained by its unique status as a new global 
governance organization. In the nation-state system, the supply of External accountability 
in a transnational context is difficult and complicated. Either the corporation must be 
regulated by one national government (in which case the norms and laws involved will 
have no legitimacy outside that state) or it will require an international treaty (which 
involves governments in a host of costly, time-consuming negotiations and potentially 
undesirable or difficult-to-resolve political tradeoffs).7 ICANN does have an independent, 
non-governmental appeals process, based on a private arbitration model, known as the 
Independent Review Procedure (IRP).8 IRP could be considered a form of External 
accountability but it is, by design, non-binding. Moreover, it is quite expensive if pursued 
seriously.9  Thus it is at best a weak form of External accountability. 
By way of contrast, when it comes to Voice, ICANN far exceeds the standards of 
other international, intergovernmental organizations. With its extensive participatory 
mechanisms and its thoroughgoing receptiveness to public Voice, it is more open than 
                                                
7 The “political oversight” debate engendered by the World Summit on the Information Society provides a 
clear example of how contentious any attempt to apply External accountability to a global Internet 
governance agency can become. 
8 Article IV, section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws defined the Independent Review Procedure. 
9 The procedure has only been used once, by ICM Registry in connection with the .xxx top level domain 
controversy. At the time of this writing, the results are unknown but Stuart Lawley, the proprietor of ICM 
registry, claims that the procedure has cost him US$ 5 million.  
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many national or local governmental agencies. No other private corporation that I know 
of opens up its processes to this degree. Thus, even though it is a private corporation it 
relies extensively, if not exclusively, on Voice. 
What explains this unusual pattern? My theory is that ICANN Inc.’s Board and 
management employ participation (Voice) as an alternative to, and substitute for, the 
other forms of accountability. ICANN’s massive emphasis on public participation can be 
interpreted as a kind of over-compensation for the glaring absence of Direct, Exit and 
External forms of accountability. The underlying logic is: “if you cannot control the 
Corporation, be the Corporation”; or, “if you do not like what we do, you take 
responsibility for helping us to do it differently.” If larger and larger numbers of people 
can be convinced to exercise Voice within the Corporation, ICANN can claim that its 
policies and actions are legitimate and accountable to the public because a broad and 
representative slice of the global public participated in formulating them.  
I do not suggest that this strategy of substitution is a conscious one intended to 
deceive or mislead the community of actors around ICANN. Rather, I see it as a logical 
response to the political and organizational tensions inherent in ICANN’s DNA. ICANN 
consists of an all-powerful Board with the legal and organizational authority to rule from 
the top down, yet this Board co-exists with norms and expectations derived from a 
bottom-up standards organization and a government agency. Given this Board’s utter 
independence from the normal forms of accountability associated with the corporate 
model and its obvious self-interest in remaining free of the other forms of accountability, 
ICANN has learned to develop ever-more elaborate and extensive forms of participation 
as a response to the absence of accountability. 
This conclusion is corroborated by a historical analysis of some changes in 
ICANN’s structure. The accountability framework discussed above provides a good 
analytical basis for examining some aspects of ICANN’s historical evolution.  
ICANN, the accountability problem and participation: 
Some historical episodes 
In 1998, as ICANN was being created, several factions argued that the only 
solution to the accountability problem was for ICANN to become a membership 
organization and for its members to directly elect the Board. The Clinton administration 
officials overseeing the process agreed with this argument. They agreed despite the utter 
hostility with which the initial incorporators of ICANN, Jon Postel and Joe Sims, reacted 
to the suggestion. In its negotiations with the fledgling ICANN the Commerce 
Department ultimately required it to develop a membership that would elect half of its 
Board. (Mueller, 2002 p. 183-4) 
The flight from direct accountability: from elections to ALAC 
 There is a lot of scholarly and policy literature about the ICANN elections of 
2000. (See Klein, (ed.) 2001; NAIS, 2001) That work discusses democracy in cyberspace 
and asks whether the elections were a success or a failure. This paper is not concerned 
with that issue. Whatever the merits or flaws of elections as a means placing people on its 
Board, the issue is moot because ICANN abolished its membership and its ability to 
directly elect Board members near the end of 2002. (Froomkin, 2003b) In the place of 
individual membership, ICANN’s Board created the At Large Advisory Committee 
(ALAC) and a Nominating Committee. This was, in fact, one of the first and most 
important structural changes in ICANN. It was the first step toward reconciling the 
inconsistencies in the three organizational models and marked the ascendancy of the 
private corporation model. It was the beginning of the process of substituting 
participatory structures and corporate patronage relationships for Direct modes of 
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accountability. The 2002 “reforms” moved decisively away from Direct accountability 
towards an advisory-participatory structure that had to be mediated and managed by 
ICANN’s staff.  
The Nominating Committee (NomCom) is now the primary mechanism for 
placing people on the Board. It appoints all Board members except for the 6 elected by 
the Supporting Organizations. It also appoints voting members to the Councils of the 
Supporting Organizations and one third of the ALAC. NomCom consists of five (5) 
people appointed by ALAC, nine (9) members appointed by various constituencies or 
organs of the Supporting Organizations, two (2) appointed by the sitting Board of 
Directors, and two (2) from technical organizations. It vets Board candidates in secret and 
selects most of its members on the basis of these private deliberations.  
ALAC is a committee of 15 people, three for each world region recognized by 
ICANN. ALAC represents the demotion of the individual Internet user from autonomous 
voter to a category of indirect representation by a small committee. ALAC, which advises 
the ICANN Board about “the interests of individual Internet users,” is supposed to be 
merely the capstone of a broader group known as the “At-Large community.” This 
“community” is formed around five regional organizations composed of entities 
recognized as “At Large Structures.” At Large Structures are organizations that purport to 
represent individual Internet users in a given region, and apply to ICANN staff and 
ALAC to be accredited as such. These organizations are federated into Regional At Large 
Organizations (RALOs), yet another tier of organization. RALOs elect people from their 
region to the ALAC and supposedly carry on dialogues about policy issues before 
ICANN. One of the oddest aspects of the At Large community is that despite its official 
claim that it advises on the needs of “individual Internet users,” RALOs do not permit 
individuals to join! Only organizations can be recognized as At Large Structures. After 
six years of existence, only 82 such organizations have been accredited by ICANN, an 
average of about 16 per world region.10 At least half of these organizations are local 
Internet Society chapters. Of the 15 ALAC members, two are elected for each world 
region by one of the five RALOs, and five are appointed by the Nominating Committee. 
 The At Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the only organ of the so-called At 
Large community that has any real and direct influence in the ICANN process. It gains 
this influence through its authority to appoint liaisons to the Board, the GNSO Council, 
and other ICANN committees, and through its power to appoint five members to the 
important Nominating Committee. Recently, ICANN announced that it would allow 
ALAC to appoint a voting member to the Board.11  
ALAC seats are plums for those who seek recognition and status in the social 
ecology of ICANN. As anointed representatives of “individual Internet users,” ALAC 
representatives are flown to ICANN meetings at the corporation’s expense and given 
lodging and a per diem at the 5-star conference hotel. They have direct access to many 
Board members and are in regular communication with the high-level policy staff. 
Approximately five full time staff members devote their time to “supporting” or 
managing ALAC and the At Large community. Although precise budget figures are 
unavailable, it would be uncontroversial to estimate the annual cost of supporting the At 
Large as between $1 and $2 million. 
The contrast between the approach before and after the “reform” is stark: a form 
of Direct accountability that enfranchised potentially billions of individual users was 
replaced by a committee of fifteen people and a Nominating Committee of about two 
dozen insiders. ALAC appoints people to NomCom, and NomCom appoints people to 
                                                
10 At Large Structure application and certification process. 
http://www.atlarge.icann.org/applications?filter0=160 
11 Prior to this ALAC merely put a non-voting liaison on the Board. 
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ALAC; a self-reinforcing circularity is one of the most prominent features of ICANN’s 
participatory structures.12 If we compare voting to the “At Large community” as a means 
of organizing public collective action, we see major, radical differences. True, both 
permit civil society to participate in ICANN – and both cost significant sums of money. 
But in the At Large, numerous gatekeepers and levels of indirection are superimposed on 
the process. The average member of the public, whose stake in domain name policy is 
small, is unlikely to have a strong enough incentive to devote the time it takes to become 
regularly involved in a complex, multi-tiered At Large community and attend numerous 
meetings or working groups – unless they see these structures as career opportunities. 
More importantly, the At Large approach makes civil society participation and input 
dependent upon support and management by the ICANN professional staff. Indeed, the 
At Large can be viewed as a kind of patronage system through which people who are 
loyal to the corporation can be recruited, rewarded and elevated while those who are not 
can be discouraged. There is no autonomy in the structure. For this reason, the At Large 
has been compared to a “company union.”13 A company union internalizes and subjects 
to corporate management the bargaining relationship between the corporation and its 
employees. It replaces what is supposed to be an independent collective bargaining 
relationship between employees and employer with a participatory structure defined and 
owned by the corporation.  
 There is also a bureaucratic imperative at work. Those who rise politically 
through the ALAC hierarchy tend to become advocates for increasing ALAC’s share of 
budgetary resources and power in the corporation. To put it bluntly, ALAC becomes an 
advocate for ALAC, not necessarily for individual users. At any rate, the construct of 
“individual Internet user” as a category of representation is odd and ironic. In a 
democracy, individual citizens are considered to be autonomous agents with their own 
distinct interests. The diversity of those interests is recognized, as individual members of 
the demos are expected to self-form political parties or interest groups that correspond to 
their heterogeneous political positions. In ICANN, in contrast, the individual becomes an 
abstraction with a homogeneous interest that is “represented” indirectly by multi-layered 
and highly vetted processes.  
Flight from the governmental model: the GNSO Improvements 
In 2007, ICANN’s Board Governance committee proposed another round of reforms that 
promised to create a more representative and consensus-based policy making process in 
its Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO).14 These reforms were proposed in 
response to a surprisingly independent and accurate report assessing the GNSO produced 
by consultants from the London School of Economics.  
The story of the reforms’ implementation reveals the simultaneous interaction of 
the three organizational models identified by Palfrey. Consensual, bottom-up standards 
organization and representative governmental agency are both regularly invoked in the 
public dialogue around these reforms. But it is the private corporation model that, while 
                                                
12 Indeed, for several years following the 2002 “reforms” the 15 members of the “interim ALAC” were 
appointed by the Board and/or the Nominating Committee because there were no RALOs in existence yet.  
13 See for example Appendix 3: Concurrence from Karl Auerbach, member of the ALAC Review Working 
Group, p. 34, Review of the At Large Advisory Committee, Final Report of the ALAC Review Working 
Group on ALAC Improvements, February 2009. http://www.icann.org/en/reviews/alac/final-report-alac-
review-28jan09-en.pdf  
14 “Generic” is the awkward word used by the ICANN community to denote any top level domain names 
that are not two-letter country codes. Top-level domains such as .com, .org, net, .info, and .mobi are 
considered generic. About 2/3 of the world’s domain name registrations are under so-called generic 
domains. 
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not explicitly or openly discussed during the reforms, emerges as dominant and drives the 
nature and direction of the changes.  
The GNSO prior to the reforms 
The GNSO, while not well known to people outside of ICANN, is a central nexus 
of ICANN politics. It is a representational structure that is supposed to develop 
consensual public policies that govern generic top level domains. Consistent with the 
Palfrey thesis, the GNSO was created to be both a representational-legislative body and a 
bottom-up consensus development apparatus – an oxymoron that plagues its functioning 
to this day. The GNSO was forced to be representational because, at the time of 
ICANN’s founding, everyone realized that the rules and regulations affecting domain 
name – trademark conflicts and new top level domains would have profound effects on 
the distribution of costs and benefits among various parties. Thus, the interest groups 
involved in domain name policy demanded representative shares in the formulation of 
policies. This included, inter alia, big business holders of trademarks, the registration 
industry, civil liberties-oriented public advocacy groups, holders of country code TLD 
delegations, and the Internet technical community.  
The GNSO has two main powers.15 It appoints two members to the Board, and its 
Council initiates the policy development process that is supposed to govern the contracts 
governing generic domain names. From 2003 to 2009, the GNSO was composed of six 
constituencies. Two of these constituencies were domain name supply industry interests: 
Registrars and Registries. They are called “contracting parties” because their very 
existence as businesses depends on having contracts with ICANN and these contracts are 
the mechanism used by ICANN to govern them. Three of the other constituencies are 
basically large business entities: the Business Constituency, Intellectual Property 
Constituency, and the Internet Service Provider Constituency, which consists of large 
telecommunication companies. There was, finally, a Noncommercial Users Constituency 
(NCUC), which included public interest advocacy groups, universities, and education and 
research networks. NCUC often took a critical perspective on the demands of the other 
commercial interest groups. Each of these constituencies elects a certain number of 
representatives to a Council. Since 2003, registrars and registries have had weighted 
voting; for every seat on the Council they get two votes. In addition to the 18 Council 
members elected by constituencies, three more are appointed by ICANN’s Nominating 
Committee. 
The GNSO Council was originally conceived as the legislative body in ICANN’s 
policy making process. It identified problems that need to be addressed, collected 
information and public comment on how to address them, formulated policies to fix the 
problems, voted on them, and, if the policy passed, passed it on to the Board for approval 
and then to the staff for implementation. Reflecting the dominance of the consensus 
standards-development model, however, the term “legislative body” is a term of 
opprobrium in ICANN. But in reality the whole point of the GNSO is to initiate rules and 
policies that govern the domain name industry. So if the GNSO is not a legislator then the 
Board and staff certainly are, and at minimum the Council is a legislative subcommittee 
that formulates the basic policy guidelines for the Board to consider and, if approved, 
implement through contracts. 
 
 
                                                
15 http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm#X 
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Table 3: The GNSO Council Voting Distribution before reform 
Constituency Council seats 
Voting 
power Grouping 
Registries 3 6 
Registrars 3 6 Domain name supply 
Intellectual property 3 
Commercial users 3 
Internet service providers 3 
9 Trademark defenders 
Noncommercial users 3 3 Public interest, nonprofit 
Nominating committee 3 3 Mixed, independent 
Total 21 27   
 
In theory, the voting distribution of the pre-2009 GNSO Council created a rough 
balance between “user” and “supplier” interests, with 12 votes assigned to registries and 
registrars, and 12 to the users and 3 Nominating Committee appointees thrown in for an 
independent perspective. Right from the beginning of the SO, however, there was a 
glaring imbalance in its structure. Trademark holders, commercial users and telecom 
firms are overlapping categories. They all include large commercial entities whose 
primary interest in domain name system policy is trademark protection. These “three” 
constituencies were, for all practical purposes, one big Constituency; they held joint 
meetings at ICANN and voted together as a bloc over 90% of the time. Thus, the GNSO 
gave trademark-oriented commercial interests three times as many votes as 
noncommercial user interests. Indeed, before the 2002 round of reforms, which gave the 
contracting parties double-weighted voting, these trademark-oriented interests even had 
more votes than the contracting parties combined.  
The current round of ICANN reforms started in September 2006, when the 
London School of Economics Public Policy Group released a report assessing the GNSO. 
The report was commissioned by ICANN itself, in line with its commitment to 
continually assess and improve its performance. After several months of data collection 
and interviews, the LSE released its report in September 2006.16 While praising the 
GNSO’s ability to “make possible the policy development processes which provide the 
foundations for ICANN's legitimacy as an open and global policy-making body for the 
Internet,” the report laid bare numerous flaws. One of them, revealingly, was that the 
ICANN Board paid little attention to the GNSO and had few institutionalized channels 
for communicating with it. So much for “bottom-up.”  
The LSE report directed its most pointed recommendations at the GNSO’s 
Constituency structure. “The current pattern of Constituencies is relatively complex and 
no longer seems well-adapted to the needs of all stakeholders in the rapidly changing 
Internet community,” the report said. In particular, it noted that participation in the user 
constituencies was narrow and tended to be dominated by a small core of people: “The 
Constituencies show a mixed pattern of participation, with relatively high levels of 
involvement in two Constituencies covering Registries and Registrars, but relatively 
narrow participation in four others, covering business users, intellectual property, Internet 
service providers and non-commercial users.” Note well: the charge of nonparticipation 
was leveled equally at commercial and noncommercial users; this will become important 
later when we show how the Board selectively directed that charge at noncommercial 
users only. “There are some worrying signs,” the Executive summary went on, “of 
dominance of some constituencies by a small core of people and of low participation 
rates in policy development work by Constituency members.” The LSE report 
                                                
16 LSE Public Policy Group and Enterprise LSE, “A Review of the Generic Names Supporting 
Organization for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,” September 2006. 
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/gnso-review-report-sep06.pdf 
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documented and legitimized longstanding complaints that there was no major distinction 
between the three business constituencies and that maintaining all three of them as 
separate constituencies simply multiplied the votes of the same interests. 
In its recommendations, LSE suggested that GNSO be restructured into three 
basic groupings: the domain name registration industry (registries and registrars), 
business, and civil society. The Registration Interests group would merge the registry and 
registrar Constituencies into one. The Businesses group would merge the trademark, 
commercial users and ISP constituency into one. Civil Society would be populated by the 
kind of organizations that formerly went into the NCUC. The report suggested that this 
would be a cleaner and more flexible division of the world. And the threshold for 
“consensus” policy would be raised to 75% of the votes. The proposal balanced the 
distribution of voting power more evenly and raised the bar for policies to pass, giving 
two of the stakeholder groups veto power if they remained unified. There was no way 
around it: ICANN’s own hired experts were proposing a major redistribution of power in 
the GNSO.  
 ICANN’s Board Governance Committee formed a Working Group (BGC-WG) to 
consider the recommendations and make specific proposals for reform. Formed on 30 
March 2007, the BGC-WG was dominated by what one might call “ICANN idealists” – 
people who favor a bottom up, consensus-oriented approach to policy making modeled 
on the institutions of the Internet technical community.17 The BGC-WG operated for 
about a year. After several rounds of comments and modifications, it released its final 
recommendations in February 2008, which were adopted by the Board.18  
The GNSO Improvements report of the BGC-WG proposed two main changes in 
the way the GNSO would work. One was to adopt an IETF-style Working Group model 
as the basis for policy making. The second was to regroup GNSO constituencies into four 
broader “Stakeholder Groups” and to restructure the GNSO Council and its voting along 
these lines. We discuss here only the second change. The final BGC-WG 
recommendations proposed to rebalance the GNSO Council along the lines suggested by 
Figure 1.  
The Board clearly viewed the lack of participation in the GNSO as a threat to its 
legitimacy and wanted to encourage the entry of “new players.” But as the GNSO 
reforms were implemented, an intense form of political competition among existing 
players developed. The commercial interest groups lobbied strenuously against the 
reduction of their voting power on the Council. They did this by vocally attacking the net 
gains afforded to the Noncommercial Stakeholder Group, claiming that NCUC was small 
and unrepresentative.19  
                                                
17 It was chaired by Roberto Gaetano and included six other Board members or liaisons: Rita Rodin; Vanda 
Scartezini; Raimundo Beca; Tricia Drakes; Susan Crawford; and Vittorio Bertola. 
18 REPORT OF THE BOARD GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE GNSO REVIEW WORKING GROUP ON 
GNSO IMPROVEMENTS, 3 February 2008. http://www.icann.org/en/topics/gnso-improvements/gnso-
improvements-report-03feb08.pdf 
19 The charge was not supported by the facts. In mid-2009, the GNSO’s Business Constituency website 
listed 44 members (about the same size as the NCUC in mid-2008) and the trademark Constituency's 
website listed 18 member organizations. The third commercial user constituency, the ISP Constituency, did 
not even publish a membership list and, reflecting its dormant nature, had no messages posted on its email 
list in the first seven months of 2009. As for diversity, 58% of the Business Constituency’s membership 
was based in the United States and nearly all others were in Europe. The London School of Economics 
Report showed that NCUC had the highest number of different people serving on the GNSO Council of any 
of the 6 constituencies in the time period 2001-2006. During that time NCUC had 15 different people serve 
on the GNSO Council.  From 2003-2006 it had 8 changes of GNSO representatives, while the ISPs had the 
same three people on the Council and the BC only had 1 change in GNSO representation. In other words, 
the ISPs and Business Constituency had the same three people representing them on the Council for nearly 
all of the GNSO's existence. The NCUC did however accept the need for broader participation and initiated 
a membership expansion campaign. This included a change in their charter to allow individuals to join the 
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Figure 1: GNSO Council distribution of voting power before and after BGC-WG 
reforms 
The ambitions of ALAC added another wrinkle to the complex politics. The Chair 
of ALAC and a few others saw the expansion of the NCSG Council seats as an 
opportunity to expand ALAC’s influence within the ICANN structure. They thought of 
themselves as the representative of users in ICANN and viewed NCUC as a threat or 
obstacle to that special designation. Three ALAC members supported the formation of a 
new “Consumer constituency” that would be composed almost entirely of At Large 
Structures that were members of various RALOs. Likewise, a group of religious 
conservatives also proposed a new constituency. Organized under CP80, a Mormon 
                                                                                                                                            
constituency (before, only organizations had been eligible). This shift was immediately effective at 
attracting new members and increasing participation. Individuals who were associated with large 
organizations, such as universities, often had found it difficult to get the official organizational approvals 
from a remote organizational hierarchy to act as their “official representative” in an organization as obscure 
and narrowly focused as ICANN. Now, people within those organizations who were interested in domain 
name policy could join NCUC. New organizations also joined. By mid-2009 its membership had tripled. 
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group that strives to utilize ICANN and other Internet governance agencies to regulate 
pornography, they petitioned to form a “Cyber-safety constituency” in the new NCSG. 
Given the proposed structure of the NCSG favored by the staff and Board, any new 
constituency of this sort would split the 6 votes of noncommercial users evenly among 
the constituencies, creating a zero sum game among the groups. 
In revamping the GNSO the Board showed a kind of obsession with getting new 
civil society actors involved in its activities. Its staff actually flew around the world 
attempting to convince major consumer advocacy organizations to join the At Large or to 
form a new constituency in the NCSG. Time and again, these consumer organizations 
told ICANN that they were focused on other issues and institutions, and that domain 
names were not a significant enough priority for them to devote staff and financial 
resources to attending ICANN meetings or tracking and participating in their complex 
processes. Ultimately, when the ALAC group’s petition to form a Consumer constituency 
was posted for public comment, not a single consumer organization in the world filed 
comments supporting it. Due to strong staff support for the ALAC initiative, however, the 
Board came very close to recognizing the proposed Consumer constituency. 
In the end, the political fights were resolved by a series of top-down decisions 
made by the Board and staff. On July 30, 2009, the Board declared, without relying on 
any objective standard, that the noncommercial interests organized under NCUC were 
“not sufficiently representative” to receive the expanded number of seats on the Council. 
This was done, Board members admitted privately, to mollify the enraged trademark and 
business interests. In its bylaw amendments implementing the GNSO reforms, it allowed 
the NCUC to elect only 3 of the 6 seats assigned to the new Noncommercial Stakeholders 
Group, and arrogated to itself the authority to appoint the additional three seats for the 
next two years at least. The Board refused to recognize CP80’s Cybersafety Constituency 
(whose proposal was very unpopular among the technical community) and deferred 
action on the Consumer constituency.  
The Board’s appointees to the NCSG were instructive. One of them was an 
NCUC member from Tunisia who was supported by and probably would have been 
elected by the noncommercial groups anyway. But the other two were strongly tied to 
commercial interests or to pro-trademark perspectives on domain name issues. One was 
the President of the International Telecommunications Users Group (INTUG) – an 
overtly business-oriented group that promotes the interests of large corporate consumers 
of telecommunication services. The other was the trademark lawyer for the American 
Red Cross. While Red Cross is a legitimate and important noncommercial organization, 
the approach to domain name policy taken by its trademark lawyer would mirror that of 
the business-oriented intellectual property constituency in most if not all cases.  
The point here is not to debate the merits of the particular selections. It is to call 
attention to the near-absolute discretion the Board had (and still has) over its supposedly 
bottom-up, representational structures. The staff personally recruited two of its 
appointees to the NCSG Council seats, and the Board showed that it can reach directly 
into these structures and shape them to suit its own sense of what is in the interest of the 
corporation and what is a proper political balance among the various contending forces 
involved. One should not confuse this process with an open, bottom-up consensus-
development process, nor should one confuse it with a democratic, governmental 
representational structure. Instead, one must view it as a private corporation actively 
managing its relationship to the community of people who are forced to deal with it by 
virtue of its exclusive control of the domain name system. 
Indeed, all the political contention over the composition of the GNSO Council 
tends to detract attention from the subordination of the GNSO’s policy making role to the 
Board and staff. When the GNSO’s laboriously developed policy on adding new top level 
domains met with organized resistance from trademark advocates, the Board created an 
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ad hoc group known as the Implementation Review Team to propose sweeping revisions 
in the GNSO’s proposed policies and procedures.20 The staff and President have also 
taken the initiative in adjusting policy regarding the regulation of the economic 
relationship between registries and registrars. In their “implementation” of the new gTLD 
program they commissioned economic consultancy studies and proposed contractual 
terms that would liberalize certain aspects of registry-registrar regulation. Again, the 
point here is not whether these initiatives produced better or worse policy but that most of 
the key policy decisions are made through direct lobbying and bargaining with the Board, 
not through bottom up intermediary structures. 
Flight from external accountability: The Affirmation of 
Commitments 
The third ICANN reform discussed here is the Affirmation of Commitments (AoC). It is 
a new agreement released September 30, 2009 involving the U.S. Commerce Department 
and ICANN. The AoC replaces the Joint Project Agreement, under which the Commerce 
Department exercised ongoing supervision of ICANN on a unilateral basis. U.S. 
unilateralism was a very sensitive geopolitical issue, and many in the Internet community 
welcomed its demise. The AoC represents an important step away from unilateral U.S. 
control of ICANN, and in that respect could open the door to a more globalized form of 
accountability eventually.  
 The main argument for letting the JPA expire was that ICANN was supposed to 
be a global institution and a special form of oversight by one government was 
inconsistent with that mandate. The problems with unilateral oversight were not 
hypothetical; from its intervention to kill the .xxx top level domain to DNSSEC 
implementation to the issue of Whois and privacy, the U.S. influenced ICANN policy in 
numerous ways. The argument against letting the JPA expire, however, was always about 
External accountability. Even those who opposed U.S. unilateralism and thought the JPA 
was a dysfunctional form of oversight expressed doubts about the wisdom of eliminating 
this one remaining tether to a public authority. In the AoC we see the end of one form of 
External accountability. What does it put in its place? The answer is predictable: more 
“community participation.” 
 The AoC establishes three-year review cycles in four areas of concern: 1) 
accountability-transparency-public interest; 2) security-stability-resiliency; 3) 
competition-consumer trust-consumer choice; and 4) Whois (which is grouped under the 
consumer trust heading but has its own review process). These reviews are conducted by 
panels appointed by agreement of the Chair of ICANN’s Governmental Advisory 
Committee (GAC) and the ICANN Board Chair or President. The review teams develop 
nonbinding recommendations, and the Board must act on these recommendations within 
6 months. Each review panel must include the GAC Chair, the ICANN Board chair or 
President, and representatives of ICANN’s Supporting Organizations and Advisory 
Committees. They can also include a sprinkling of independent experts. 
 The actual process for conducting these reviews is not defined at the time of this 
writing. But statements by the GAC chair at the Seoul ICANN meeting (October 2009) 
indicate that once again, the public will be offered Voice instead of any new form of 
External or Direct accountability. As GAC chair Janis Karklins stated, “In my view, the 
review [should not be confined to] the review teams, but should be a community review.  
And we need to construct the process in a way that [the] community is involved from the 
                                                
20 The report of the IRT can be found here. http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/irt-draft-report-
trademark-protection-24apr09-en.pdf  
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very beginning to the very end in the review process.”21 The characteristic approach of 
making transparency and participation the solution to all problems was evident, as 
Karklins went on to say:  
“Now, in my view, the work of review teams should be transparent to the 
extreme.  …I mean they should be live video streamed or video cast.  [So] that 
everybody who wants to be present in the room should be present live in the 
room.  So that there shouldn't be any hidden moments when team does something 
that the community is not informed [about]. In my view, this is the way how to 
ensure that there is no competition for being on these teams, because everybody 
will be …present in the room in meeting.”22 
So, once again, the public will be afforded every opportunity to express their opinion 
about ICANN’s performance and to observe the process of evaluation. Missing from the 
equation, however, are any objective criteria upon which to base the reviews (e.g., law), 
and any specifics about who will have decision-making power to rectify any deficiencies. 
As always, it is the Board and the Board alone with decision making authority; the review 
panel recommendations are nonbinding.  
 One again, circularity characterizes the process. The review panels mandated by 
the Affirmation are selected by two people at the top of the decision making chain in 
ICANN; moreover, the people selected as reviewers are required to be representative of 
ICANN’s existing policy making organs. In other words, the people who are being 
reviewed constitute the team of reviewers; and the review process reproduces the 
structure and politics of ICANN. A circular self-evaluation process is proposed instead of 
any real external accountability. 
 This form of participation, moreover, may end up as a substitute for other 
accountability mechanisms. ICANN’s success in convincing the U.S. Commerce 
Department to end its Joint Project Agreement and replace it with the new Affirmation of 
Commitments seems to have cut short ICANN’s effort to develop new accountability 
mechanisms. Proposals made by the previous President’s Strategy Committee to institute 
new accountability measures have been interrupted.23 It remains to be seen whether this is 
simply an artifact of the change of Presidents or whether the whole accountability-
strengthening exercise was a driven primarily by ICANN’s attempt to free itself of the 
JPA. 
Conclusion: Understanding ICANN, Inc. 
Although Palfrey was right about the presence of three distinct organizational 
logics or models within it, the story of ICANN’s organizational evolution since 1999 is a 
story of how the corporate governance model has assimilated and subordinated the other 
elements. What makes ICANN Inc. troublesome is neither its “private” nature nor its 
“corporate” nature per se, but the way it has monopoly control of a resource space critical 
to an entire global infrastructure while being completely disconnected from the normal 
accountability mechanisms that guide and constrain other corporations. Although it is a 
nonprofit, it has no membership with specific interests that pay its dues and elect its 
officers to serve a well-defined mission – unlike, say, the Regional Internet Registries. 
Although it takes in a large and growing amount of revenue and stands at the center of a 
number of highly contentious commercial interests, it has no competitors, nor does it 
                                                
21 Transcript of Seoul ICANN meeting, Consultation on the Affirmation of Commitments, Wednesday, 28 
October 2009 - 17:30 - 18:30. http://sel.icann.org/node/7481  
22 Ibid. 
23 See the records of the “Improving Institutional Confidence Consultation” on the ICANN web site, which 
included proposals for a strengthened appeals process, a vote of no confidence, and some other measures. 
http://www.icann.org/en/jpa/iic/draft-iic-implementation-26feb09-en.pdf  
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have corporate shareholders with the legal right and the economic incentives to see that it 
performs properly. Unlike a government, it has no citizens enfranchised to share in its 
power through election and representation. Unlike an intergovernmental organization, it 
is not composed of member-states with direct forms of accountability over it. 
In the absence of these basic moorings, ICANN’s mission will be to maintain and 
strengthen itself, by managing its relationship to the community of people who are forced 
to deal with it by virtue of its control of the DNS. The “self” that it maintains and 
strengthens is its staff and a slowly expanding, self-selecting network of insiders 
(including government officials) who climb its organizational ladders to obtain influential 
positions.  It optimizes for its own autonomy, stability and revenue. 
The concept of “participation” plays a central role in maintaining this process. 
ICANN invites comment and participation ceaselessly. It offers it to civil society, to 
governments, to technologists, to business – an exhausting array of opportunities to “get 
involved.” Participation is ICANN’s chief legitimizing principle. But none of these forms 
of participation provide the participants with any clear accountability mechanisms. 
Indeed, each of the reforms discussed in this paper involves offering more participation at 
the price of less formal, less clear accountability.  
We need to think harder about the implications of a global governance private 
corporation that permits and even encourages civil society involvement but acts to co-opt 
ambitious or acquiescent civil society actors and maintain significant top-down controls 
over their participation. While this institutional model is in many ways more open and 
probably also more responsive than the traditional inter-governmental international 
institution, we need to be aware of its dangers and flaws. Most importantly, we need to 
reassess the importance of public participation relative to harder forms of public 
accountability. Participation may not be an adequate substitute for accountability 
mechanisms, and “more participation” may not be the answer to all of a global 
governance institution’s problems. 
It could be worse. The presence of participatory channels into ICANN is better 
than having its important governance responsibilities conducted without such public 
participation. To criticize participation as an end in itself is not to advocate shutting off 
those avenues entirely; to criticize ICANN’s lack of accountability is not to support a 
reversion to more traditional forms of governance by means of international inter-
governmental organizations. These criticisms should, however, push us towards the 
discovery and implementation of new forms of globalized direct accountability and 
perhaps, also, a more relaxed attitude toward Exit alternatives such as competing root 
systems.  
While the concept and definition of civil society is problematic,24 civil society 
influence and participation in international institutions is important. In global governance, 
there is no institutional structure to provide democratic governance through a global 
citizenry. The concept of civil society thus serves as a kind of proxy for the global public 
interest.25 Without civil society, business and government make deals that serve narrow 
special interests. If ICANN’s actions are to serve the public interest, it must provide civil 
society and individual users of the Internet some kind of representation and influence that 
corresponds to the stakes they have in its policies and practices. And yet the practical and 
organizational challenges associated with reflecting the interests of large numbers of 
people with small stakes in an outcome are well known from collective action and 
                                                
24 Civil society is a complex concept that cannot be explored in detail in this paper. In “multi-stakeholder” 
governance institutions such as ICANN, it is usually understood as the third leg in a three-legged stool that 
involves business and government. More broadly, it stands for the economic and political interests of the 
individual qua individual, and especially for the noncommercial and human rights aspects of policy. 
25 It is widely recognized that nation-states do not do an adequate job of indirectly representing the public 
interest in global governance, although it is outside the scope of this paper to develop that argument fully. 
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institutional theory. (Olson 1965; Ostrom and Ostrom, 1975) Direct participation in all of 
ICANN’s processes is not, by itself, the answer for true public accountability. We need to 
revisit the concept of membership in ICANN and strengthen ICANN’s Independent 
Review Process. Other forms of accountability, such as a recall or Board members and a 
replacement of the Nominating Committee, should be considered as well.  
Returning to Palfrey’s article, its title and conclusion are, upon reflection, quite 
strange. The title announces “the end of the [ICANN] experiment.” But the experiment 
that is ICANN has not ended. If anything, ICANN has grown in significance since his 
paper was written. Palfrey concludes the article with the puzzling statement “Those who 
care about democracy and technology should shift their attention away from ICANN, 
which is almost certainly now beyond repair, and toward the many greener fields in 
cyberspace.” Whether or not ICANN is truly “beyond repair,” the admonition to “shift 
attention away” from it invokes the image of an ostrich with its head in the sand – the 
false and dangerous belief that things can’t hurt you if you refuse to pay attention to 
them. ICANN is still an important institution in cyberspace, with control of critical 
resources. Either we must take responsibility for repairing it; or mount efforts to shift its 
governance responsibilities elsewhere; or encourage the growth of technologies or 
institutions that can bypass it and undermine its authority. It is hard to conceive of a 
rationale by which those who care about free and fair Internet governance can simply 
ignore it. 
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